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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
One pervasive aspect of decision-making under time pressure
is the salience of negative information. Research has repeatedly
concluded that “the harassed decision maker” tends to weigh the
possible negative consequences of his or her action heavily to the
relative disregard of the possible positive rewards of those same
actions. In this paper, we propose that the salience of negative
information under time pressure not merely leads to risk-aversion,
but that it may reverse an individual’s usual preferences.
Individuals are typically either risk-seeking or risk-averse.
Research outside the time pressure domain has shown that, when
negative information becomes salient, risk-seeking individuals
perceive little room for further gains but large likelihood of accru-
ing losses, causing them to adopt risk-averse behaviours. In a choice
between a modest-but-certain and greater-but-uncertain gamble,
risk-seeking individuals tend to adopt risk-averse behaviours whereas
risk-averse individuals tend to adopt risk-seeking ones. Mean-
while, for risk-averse individuals, the salience of negative informa-
tion only adds to the extant negativity, causing them to adopt risk-
seeking behaviours with the hopes of removing the negative state.
We extend these findings to the time pressure domain and suspect
that time pressure would likewise be one instance where individuals
would reverse their usual risk preferences to adapt to the salience of
negative information. We examine this possibility in three studies.
In Study 1, participants with positive (negative) affect chose a
riskier (certain) lottery to a NHL hockey game when there was no
time pressure, but adopted the certain (riskier) approach under time
pressure. We thus demonstrated the basic outline of our hypothesis.
In Study 2, we used a gambling task in which participants
stated their willingness to gamble for specific dollar amounts. We
also added a thought protocol to assess the participants’ emphases
on positive versus negative outcomes during the gambling process.
Under no time pressure, risk-seeking (risk-averse) individuals
focused more on positive (negative) outcomes than negative (posi-
tive) ones. Under time pressure, however, risk-seeking (risk-averse)
individuals focused more on negative (positive) outcomes than
positive (negative) ones. The focus on positive versus negative
information for risk-seeking and risk-averse individuals reversed
under time pressure. These differences in foci on positive versus
negative outcomes mediated the preference reversal.
In Study 3, we explored a similar preference reversal in
regulatory orientation using a consumer choice task involving
toothpaste and grape juice brands as well as investment choices.
Under no time pressure, promotion- (prevention-) focused indi-
viduals preferred promotion- (prevention-) framed and risk-seek-
ing (risk-averse) brands and choices. Under time pressure, how-
ever, promotion- (prevention-) focused individuals preferred pre-
vention- (promotion-) framed and risk-averse (risk-seeking) brands
and choices.
Taken together, the three studies suggest that individuals tend
to reverse their preference for risky choices under time pressure
compared to situations under no such constraint. It is important to
note, however, that preference reversals in risky choices do not
occur because risk-seeking individuals want to avoid risks or that
risk-averse individuals want to take risks, but that they need to.
Risk-seeking individuals adopt risk-averse behaviours when nega-
tive information becomes salient because such an approach can
secure gains, in line with the goals of risk-seeking. Conversely,
risk-averse individuals adopt risk-seeking behaviours when nega-
tive information becomes salient because such an approach can
avoid further losses, in line with the goals of risk-aversion. Thus,
preference reversals are not in innate risk preferences, but in the
perception and adoption of the behaviours that best serve their
objectives given the circumstance. Our findings have important
marketing implications since consumers often face decision-mak-
ing tasks under time pressure in everyday life.
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